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Most people have preconceived
notions of randomness that often dif
fer substantially from true random
ness. A classroom favori te is the
counterintuitive fact that, in a ran
domly selected group of 23 people,
the probability is bigger than 50%
that at least two share the same birth
day. A more serious example concern
ing "false-positives" in medical testing
is this: Suppose that a person is
selected at random from a large pop
ulation of which 1% are drug users
and that a drug test is administered
which is 98% reliable (i.e., drug users
test positive with probability .98, and
nonusers test negative with probabil
ity .98). The somewhat surprising
fact is that, if the test result is posi
tive, then the person tested is never
theless more than twice as lilzely to be
a nonuser than a user. Similar surpris
es concerning unexpected properties
of truly random datasets make it dif
ficult to fabricate numerical data suc
cessfully.

Misperceptions of
Randomness
To demonstrate this to beginning stu
dents of probability, I often ask them to
do the following homework assign
ment the first day. TIley are either to
flip a coin 200 times and record the
results or merely pretend to flip a coin
and fake the results. The next day I
amaze them by glancing at each stu
dent's list and correctly separating
nearly all the true from the faked data.
The fact in this case is that in a truly
random sequence of 200 tosses it is
extremely likely that a run of SLX heads
or six tails will occur (the exact proba
bility is somewhat complicated to cal
culate), but the average person trying
to fake such a sequence will rarely
include runs of that length.
This is but one example of the well
documented observation that most
people cannot generate truly random
numerical data. A study published in
1953 by psychologist A. Chapanis

describes his experiment in which
subjects were asked to write out long
sequences of numbers (digits 0
through 9) in random order. His
results showed that different individu
als exhibit marked preferences for cer
tain decimal digits, and that repetitive
pairs or triplets such as 222, 333 are
avoided, whereas preferred triplets
usually are made up of digits all of
which are different - for example,
653 or 231. This tendency to avoid
long runs and include too many alter
nations, as in my class demonstration,
has been confirmed by many
researchers. Most recently it has
played a role in the arguments of cog
nitive psychologists Gilovich, Vallone,
and Tversky (1985) that the "hot
hand:' in basketball is nothing more
than a popular misperception because
long streaks in truly random data are
much more .likely to occur than is
commonly believed.
Such misperceptions of random
ness of data can be capitalized on. In

the Massachusetts Numbers Game,
players bet on a four-digit number of
their choice, after which a four-digit
number is selected at random (by com
puter or mechanical device), and those
who had bct on the winning number
share the tax-depleted pot equally. At
first glance it seems to many people
that any four-digit number is as good as
any other, but a moment's reflection
reveals that numbers such as 1776 or
1960 are probably more likely to be bet
on than numbers such as 7716 or
9061. Since all four-digit numbers are
equally likely to be winners, it is there
fore desirable to bet on numbers that
very few other people choose because
when such numbers win their owners
will not have to share the pot with
many other people. Several years after
the Massachusetts N umbers Game
began operating in 1976, M.LT. statis
tician H. Chernoff used newspaper
announcements of the winning num
bers and payoffs to empirically deter
mine lists of numbers with positive
expected payoffs.
[His 1981 article also contained a
"birthday-problem" calculation to
show that the probability of no dupli
cation of a four-digit number in 500
random trials is about .000003, where
as an article in the Boston Globe giving
an update of the Game reported that,
as was to be expected (since there are
10,000 possible numbers), none of the
first 500 randomly selected four-digit
numbers had been repeated. In a letter
to the Editor, the Commissioner of the
State Lottery con'ected the original
report, pointing out that there had
been several duplications in the short
history of the game.]

fraud or fabrication include both deter
ministic and statistical methods.
One example of a deterministic
method is analysis of round-off
approximations. In an article on
rounding percentages in 1979 in the
Journal of the American Statistical
Association, p. 363, statisticians P.
Diaconis and D. Freedman's analysis
of numerical data in a well-known
paper
raises the suspicion that [the author]
manipulated the data to make the rows
round properly. This suspicion is not
hard to verify. . .. The percentage of
numbers with leading digit 7 is reported
as 5.5, with a total of 335 cases. The
only proportions compatible with 5.5 are
18/335, which rounds to 5.4, or 19/335,

The remainder of this article will
focus on statistical methods for detect
ing fake data, and the general idea
behind such tests is quite simple:
Identify properties of numerical
datasets (of particular types) that are
(a) highly likely to occur in true
datasets of that type and (b) highly
unlikely to occur in fabricated datasets
of that type.
The earlier example of using the
pattern "runs of six or longer" to
detect faked data in strings of 200
coin tosses is exactly such a test, and
of course many other similar tests are
available. One of the newer tests cur
rently being used is based on a cen-

Table 1 - Eighteen Stocks with Dollar Values
Approximately Satisfying Benford's law
Conversion to other currencies (such as pesos) or taking reciprocals both closely
retain significant digit frequencies.
Stock
A

B
C
D
E
F
G

H
I

J
K
L
M
N
0
P

True Versus
Fabricated Data
Determining whether real numelical
data have been fabricated or altered is
often of great importance - in verify
ing e>"'Perimental scientific data, such
as medical trials, on which crucial
decisions depend; in census data that
helps determine political boundaries
and governmental subsidies; in tax
return data submitted to the IRS by
individuals and corporations. The var
ied techniques used in detection of

which rounds to 5.7. There is no pro
portion possible that rounds to 5.5.

Q
R

$/Stock
Pesos/Stock
Stocks/$

1
6
6
5

2
3
3
3

$/Stock Pesos/Stock
11
77
12
84
14
98
112
16
18
126
19
133
21
147
168
24
28
196
33
231
37
259
42
294
47
329
55
385
64
448
71
497
83
581
672
96

3
2
2
2

First Digit
4
2
2
2

Stocks/$
.091
.083
.071
.063
.056
.053
.048
.042
.036
.030
.027
.024
.. 021
.018
.016
.014
.012
.010

Frequencies
5
6
1
1
1
1
2
1

7
1
1
1

8
1
1

1

9
1
1
1

tury-old observation called Benford's
law, or the significant-digit law.

Benford's Law
The significant-digit law is the empiri
cal observation that in many naturally
occurring tables of numerical data, the
leading significant (nonzero) digit is
not uniformly distributed in {I,2, ... ,9}
as might be expected, but instead
obeys the law

cian S. Newcomb in 1881) predicts
that a number chosen at random has
leading significant digit I with prob
ability Jog lo 2 == .30 I, leading signifi
cant digit 2 with probability
loglo (3/2) == .176, and so on monot
onically down to probability .046 for
leading digit 9. The corresponding
Jaws for second and higher signifi
cant digits, and their joint distribu
tions is
Pr(D) = dl>" .,D k = d,J

Pr(first significant digit = d)
=loglO(1

+

= 10glo[1

}),d= 1,2,..,9.

Thus, this law (apparently first dis
covered by astronomer/mathemati-

+
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for d l E {I ,2, ... ,9} and dj E {O,l ,2, ... ,9},
j > I. This says for example, that the
probability that the first three signifi-

Table 2 - All Non-Benford Distributions Have Difference
Significant-Digit Frequencies When Converted To Other
Monetary Units
These 18 stocks are uniformly distributed in dollars (and significant digits), but the
frequencies change radically when converted to pesos or reciprocal units.
Stock
A

B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I

J
K
L
M

N

0
P

Q
R

1
$/Stock 2
Pesos/Stock
3
Stocks/$ 10

2
2
3
4

$/Stock Pesos/Stock
70
10
15
105
20
140
25
175

30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
95

3
2
3
1

210
245
280
315
350
385
420
455
490
525
560
595
630
665

Stocks/$
.100
'.067
.050
.040
.033
.028
.025'

.022
.020
.018
.017
.015
.014
.013
.013
.012
.011
.011

First Digit Frequencies
4
5
6
2
2
2
3
3
2
1
1
1

7
2
1
0

8
2
0
0

9
2
0
0

cant digits of a number are 3, 1, 4,
respectively, P((D,'o2,D 3) = (3,1,4)),
is equal to Jog lo (I +
== .0014.
This logarithmic distribution is the
only distribution on the significant
digits of real numbers that is invari
ant under changes of scale. That is, if
you calculate the probabilities of par
ticular leading significant digits (such
as P((DI,D 2 ,D 3 ) = (3,1,4)), then
these
logarithmic
probabilities
remain unchanged when the underly
ing dataset is multiplied by 2 or by 1T,
or under any other change of scale
(e.g., from English to metric units),
and they are the only probabilities
with that invariance property. For
example, if the distribution of the sig
nificant digits of a particular dataset
such as stock prices is (close to) the
Benford distribution, then conver
sion from dollars per stock to pesos
per stock will preserve the frequen
cies of the significant digits (Table 1),
whereas all non-Benford distribu
tions will not (Table 2).
Clearly the naive guess that the
leading digits are equally likely to be
one of the numbers {l,2, ... ,9} does
not exhibit scale invariance because
multiplication by 2, for example,
converts all numbers starting with 5,
6, 7, 8, or 9 into numbers starting
with 1. This implies that P(D I = 1)
must equal P(D I = 5) + P(D I =
6) + P(D I = 7) + P(D J = 8) +
P(D I = 9)
for
scale-invariance
under multiplication by 2 to hold,
which is certainly not true if P(D I =
k) is the same for all k. (The proof
that the logarithmic distribution is
the only scale-invariant distribution
on the significant digits is based on
the fact that the orbit of every point
under irrational rotation on the cir
cle is asymptotically uniformly dis
tributed) The logarithmic distribu
tion is also the only probability dis
tribution that is invariant under
change of base - for example, if the
underlying dataset is converted from
base 10 to base 100 or vice versa.
The formal statement and proof of
this~ fact is somewhat deeper.
111ese scale- and base-invariance
characterizations of the logarithmic
distribution, however clean mathe
matically, do not explain the wide
spread appearance of the distribution
in real data because that simply
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Figure 1. Benford's law predicts a decreasing frequency of first digits, from 1 through 9. The frequencies in datasets developed
by Benford for numbers appearing on the front pages of newspapers, by Mark Nigrini of 3,141 county populations in the 1990
U.S. Census, and by Eduardo Ley of the Dow Jones Industrial Average from 1918-93 follows Benford's law (the numbers given
atop each set of columns) within 2%.

changes the question of "why logarith
mic?" to "why scale-invariant?" In tlY
ing to understand the prevalence of
the logarithmic distribution in many
real datasets, J noticed that tables that
most dosely fit the log distribution are
composite samples from various distri
butions. Using the scale- and base
invariance ideas together with modern
probability tools such as constructions
of random measures, it was not diffi
cult to show that if random samples
are taken from random distributions

(in a "neutral" way), then the frequen
cies of the leading significant digits of
the combined sample will always con
verge to Benford's law. One possible
intuitive explanation is this. If a single
distribution is picked at random, then
it is certain (with probability 1) to be
scale-dependent, but sampling from
different distributions and combining
the data tends to neutralize the depen
dence on the scales, hence leading to
the only scale-invariant distribution,
Benford's law.

Empirical Evidence
of Benford's Law
In 1881, Newcomb explained that his
discovery of the significant-digit law
was motivated by an observation that
the pages of a book of logarithms
were dirtiest in the beginning and
progressively cleaner throughout. In
1938 General Electric physicist F.
Benford rediscovered the law based
on this same observation, and went
on to spend several years collecting

data from sources as different as
atomic weights, baseball statistics,
numerical data from Reader's Digest,
and areas of rivers. Newcomb's article
having been long forgotten, Benford's
name came to be associated with the
significant-digit law. Since then,
Benford's law has been found to be a
very good fit to such varied sets as
stock-market data (Dow Jones,
Standard and Poor), 1990 census
populations of the 3,141 counties in
the Unitcd States, and numbers
appearing in newspapers (see Fig. I).
Thus there is evidence that many
classes of true datasets follow
Benford's law, and in many of those
classes, such as stock-market tables,
census data, and numbers gleaned
from newspaper articles, a plausible
theoretical explanation for the
appearance of the logarithmic distribution is the random-samples-fromrandom-distributions theorem.

law in true tax data (Table 3). Nigrini
had substantial evidence that in most
fabricated tax data, however, the significant digits are not close to
Benford, and his article described a
goodness-of-fit-to-Benford test to
help identify fraudulent financial
data. This test is a partial negative
test, in that conformity does not necessarily imply true data, but nonconformity indicates some level of suspicion.
The Wall Street Journal Quly 10,
1995) reported that the chief financial
investigator for the district attorney's
office in Brooklyn, N.Y., Mr. R. Burton,
used [Nigrini's] program to analyze 784
checks issued by seven companies and
found that check amounts on 103
checks didn't conform to expected patterns [see Table 3]. "Bingo, that means
fraud," says Mr. Burton. The district
attorney has since caught the culprits,
some bookkeepers and payroll clerks,
and is charging them with theft.

Since then, according to a recent article in the Nel,ll York Times (August 4,

Detection of Fraud
U sing Benford's Law

1998),
The income tax agencies of several
nations and several states, including
California, are using detection software based on Ben ford's Law, as are a
score of large companies and accounting businesses.

Another class of datasets that has
recently been found to be a good fit
to Benford's law is true tax data.
According to accounting Professor
M. Nigrini's 1996 article in the
Journal of the American Taxation
Association, the IRS's own model files
for the line items "Interest Paid" and
"Interest Received" indicate that the
significant digits for these items are
an exceedingly close fit to Benford's

With the current exponentially
increasing availability of digital data
and computing power, the trend
toward use of subtle and powerful
statistical tests for detection of fraud
and other fabricated data is also cer-

Table 3 -

tain
to
increase
dramatically.
Benford's law is only the beginning.
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Benford's law Test for Fraudulent Data

The Benford's law row contains the logarithmic frequencies of s'ignificant digit,>, the true tax data row is from IRS files, and
the fraudulent data row is from the Brooklyn District Attorney's investigation of seven companies. Note that the fraudulent
data have fewer leading digits 1,2, and 3 than the true tax data and Benford's law and many more leading digits 5 and 6.

Benford's Law
True Tax Data
Fraudulent Data

1
30.1
30.5
0

2
17.6
17.8
1.9

3
12.5
12.6
0

First Digit Frequencies (%)
7
4
6
5
6.7
7.9
5.8
9.7
7.8
5.6
9.6
6.6
1.0
9.7 61.2 23.3

8
5.1
5.0
2.9

9
4.6
4.5
0

